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I. INTRODUCTION
What value do the people of the United States place upon the
majesty of the nation's Grand Tetons, the beauty of its coastline vistas,
or the serenity of its wilderness areas? Calculating the value of such
natural resources is a complex task that is necessary when seeking
recompense from those liable for hazardous materials spills that despoil
the environment. In Ohio v United States Department of the Interior,,
several petitioners2 sought review of Department of the Interior ("In-
terior") regulations governing the recovery of money from those re-
sponsible for spills of oil or hazardous substances that cause damage
to natural resources. Interior promulgated the regulations pursuant to
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Lia-
bility Act (CERCLA).3 The regulations prescribed assessment methods
for quantifying damages to natural resources that petitioners complained
would result in flawed damage assessments. The court rejected the
majority of the challenges to Interior's rules. However, it overturned
significant components of the rules, which should result in substantial
increases in liability for damages to natural resources.
State and environmental petitioners raised a number of issues con-
cerning Interior's choices of economic values and policies in challenging
the regulations. The petitioners complained that resource valuation pur-
suant to Interior's regulations undervalued the damages recoverable from
parties responsible for harm to the environment. Conversely, industry
petitioners complained that the regulations overstated damage cost es-
timates. The conflict evident in these arguments bespeaks the difficulties
intrinsic to natural resource valuation.
The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals rejected all but
three of the challenges to the regulations. The court struck down two
parts of the Interior rules and remanded a third4 for clarification. First,
Copyright 1991, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEw.
1. 880 F.2d 432 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
2. Petitioners included ten states, three environmental organizations, a chemical
industry trade association, a manufacturing company, and a utility company.
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988).
4. The court remanded Interior's regulations governing the applicability of CERCLA
damage provisions to privately owned land managed by federal, state or local government
for clarification.
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the court struck down the "lesser of" rule that allowed recompense to
be set at the lesser of the cost of restoration of damaged natural resources
or the cost of compensation for the loss of their use. Second, the court
overruled Interior's hierarchy of methods for assessing damages to nat-
ural resources because of its excessive reliance on market price to de-
termine the value of injured natural resources.
All of the rules that the court invalidated tended to reduce the
measure of damages. The court found one of those rules contrary to
the "clearly expressed intent of Congress ' 5 and the other "not a rea-
sonable interpretation ' 6 of CERCLA. The decision will impact future
environmental litigation by increasing cost liability to those responsible
for damaging natural resources. However, the degree of impact of the
court's decision depends on Interior's interpretation of the court's use
of imprecise valuation terminology.
The decision mandates that Interior expand the scope of damages
for all natural resource damage assessments. Unfortunately, the mandate
confuses the types of natural resource attributes that must be considered
when assessing damages to natural resources. The court apparently man-
dates that Interior broaden the use of contingency valuation ("CV") to
all natural resource assessments. CV is a controversial valuation technique
that uses random polling to determine the value of natural resources.
Using CV to monetize damages will greatly increase liability for injury
to natural resources. The court's mandate expanding the use of CV
appears to be an unintentional result of its incorrect classification of
certain values attributable to natural resources. The court's mandate
presents the legal issue of whether CERCLA requires that Interior include
the incorrectly classified value attributes in all damage assessments.
Deciding how to value natural resources is critical, in that placing
a value on natural resources allows courts to "assess damages for
environmental harm, deters future pollution, and helps insure protection
for natural ecosystems." 7 Economics can form the foundation of en-
vironmental protection by forcing those who over-consume or damage
publicly held resources to internalize all associated economic costs. The
provisions of CERCLA8 and the Clean Water Act ("CWA") 9 provide
state and federal government officials with authority to recover damages
from polluters who harm fish, wildlife, and other natural resources.
CERCLA seems to embody ideals espoused by Justice William 0.
5. 880 F.2d at 438.
6. Id.
7. Cross, Natural Resource Damage Valuation, 42 Vand. L. Rev. 269, 270 (1989).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(2)(A) & (B) (1988).
9. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(0(4) & (5) (1988).
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Douglas' 0 in that state and federal government officials are designated
as trustees of the natural resources and are thus entrusted with the task
of protecting our environment.
New statutes such as the Oil Pollution Act ("OPA")" expand the
significance of natural resource valuation. The OPA increases liability
for oil spills by expanding the types of damages for which polluters are
liable. For example, under the OPA polluters are liable for damages to
real or personal property and the loss of subsistence use of natural
resources.' 2 Under the OPA, Congress mandates that oil spillers be liable
for damages "for injury to, destruction of, loss of, or loss of use of,
natural resources ... ."" As Congressional mandates, such as the OPA,
continue to expand the circumstances for which natural resource valu-
ation is necessary, the methodology used for that valuation takes on
added significance.
Valuing natural resources is a difficult task that involves "meshing
different disciplines, including environmental science, resource economics,
and environmental law in a four-stage assessment process: (1) establishing
the discharge source; (2) identifying the direct resource damage; (3)
estimating indirect and expected future injuries; and (4) valuing the
damages resulting."'' 4 The focus of this casenote will be step four, placing
a monetary value on natural resource damages.
Valuation of damages to natural resources involves both practical
and philosophical problems. One practical problem results from the lack
of a market in which natural resources are traded and priced. Philo-
10. In Sierra Club v. Morton, Justice Douglass stated:
Contemporary public concern for protecting nature's ecological equilibrium should
lead to the conferral of standing of environmental objects to sue for their own
preservation ...
Inanimate objects are sometimes parties in litigation. A ship has a legal
personality, a fiction found useful for maritime purposes. The corporation sole-
a creature of ecclesiastical law-is an acceptable adversary and large fortunes
ride on its cases....
So should it be as respects valleys, alpine meadows, rivers, lakes, estuaries,
beaches, ridges, groves of trees, swampland, or even air that feels the destructive
pressures of modern technology and modern life. The river, for example, is the
living symbol of all the life it sustains or nourishes-fish, aquatic insects, water
ouzels, otter, fisher, deer, elk, bear, and all other animals, including man, who
are dependent on it or who enjoy it for its sight, its sound, or its life. The
river as plaintiff speaks for the ecological unit of life that is part of it.
405 U.S. 727, 741-43, 92 S. Ct. 1361, 1369-70 (footnotes omitted).
11. Pub. L. No. 101-380, 104 Stat. 484 (1990) (to be codified at 33 U.S.C. 2701 et.
seq.).
12. Id. § 1002(b)(2)(C) (33 U.S.C. 2702(b)(2)(C)).
13. Id. § 1002(b)(2)(A) (33 U.S.C. 2702(b)(2)(A)).
14. Yang, Valuing Natural Resource Damages: Economics for CERCLA Lawyers, 14
Envtl. L. Rep. 10311 (1984).
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sophical problems include determining whether monetary valuation of
natural resources should focus on use value (i.e. consumption or other
use for gain) alone, or should also consider nonuse values.
This casenote addresses the court's assessment of both the practical
and the philosophical problems inherent in placing a monetary value on
natural resources. The problems created by the court's imprecise language
are addressed through a careful analysis of the decision. Analysis of
CERCLA and the Interior regulations as well as the literature concerning
natural resource damage valuation also assist in resolving the problems
created by the opinion. This discussion begins with an analysis of natural
resource valuation concepts followed by a brief outline of the CERCLA
statute and the Interior regulations promulgated pursuant to CERCLA.
Next follows a discussion of the Ohio v. Interior decision emphasizing
two natural resource valuation issues that remain uncertain because of
the court's imprecise language. This discussion will indicate that the
value assigned to the natural resources of our nation, and thus the costs
assessed to those who damage natural resources depends on the inter-
pretation given the court's imprecise language. Finally, this casenote will
end with a suggested regulatory interpretation of the court's imprecise
language.
II. NATURAL RESOURCE VALUATION
Natural resource valuation is a two step process. First the person
responsible for valuation must determine the values attributable to nat-
ural resources that the valuation process is to include (i.e., consumptive
use value, non-consumptive use value, or non-use value). Second, the
valuation process must develop a method for monetizing the accounted
for values (i.e., restoration and replacement cost, market valuation,
behavioral use valuation, and contingent valuation).
A. Determination of Values Attributable to Natural Resources
Values attributable to natural resources have both use and nonuse
values. Calculating the full value of natural resources involves deter-
mining both the use and nonuse values.
1. Use Value
Use value 5 is simply the price people are willing to pay to use
natural resources. Use value includes both consumptive use and non-
15. Use value is defined as:
the value to the public of recreational or other public uses of the resource, as
measured by changes in consumer surplus, any fees or other payments collectable
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consumptive use values. An example of consumptive use value is the
costs a duck hunter is willing to incur to go hunting. For example,
duck hunters spend money on license fees, hunting leases, and travel
costs to go hunting; such use values are quantified by summing the
costs. Duck hunting is a consumptive use because ducks that are shot
are a consumed resource. The use value of duck hunting includes the
value of the ducks consumed. The value of consumed ducks is determined
by pricing ducks in commercial markets. An example of non-consumptive
use value is the costs incurred by a bird watcher on an outing. Bird
watching is non-consumptive use because birds are observed, but not
consumed. A bird watcher thus uses resources, but in a non-consumptive
way. One can determine the value of such non-consumptive use by
totaling the costs a bird watcher is willing to incur to enjoy an outing.
The costs might include the expense of field guides, binoculars, and
traveling costs. Like the duck hunter's use values described above, these
values are quantifiable by summing the costs of the items mentioned.
Hence both consumptive and non-consumptive use values are readily
determined by summing the costs borne by those who use the natural
resources.
2. Nonuse Value
Environmentalists argue that the value of natural resources extends
beyond their use value to include attributes known as intrinsic, option,
and existence values. Intrinsic value is the inherent value of natural
resources.' 6 No method exists for monetizing the intrinsic value of natural
resources. 7 The option value of a natural resource is the price that one
by the government or Indian tribe for a private party's use of the natural
resource, and any economic rent accruing to a private party because the gov-
ernment or Indian tribe does not charge a fee or price for the use of the
resource.
4 C.F.R. § 11.83(b)(1) (1990).
16. Cross, supra note 7, at 281. Cross notes that intrinsic value "recognizes that
natural resources may have value independent of humans, based on their status as natural
creatures or objects." Id.
17. Id. at 294. Cross states: "No persuasive methodologies, however, objectively and
reliably ascertain the intrinsic worth of natural resources." Id. Certain ecologists (referred
to as "deep ecologists") seek a biocentric approach that rejects the modern anthropocentric
orientation of the western, democratic, capitalist culture. See generally Pollack, Reimagining
NEPA: Choices for Environmentalists, 9 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 359, 401-13 (1985). These
ecologists feel that reliance on economic valuation of natural resources is the root of all
environmental degradation. They refuse to place a monetary value on nature, thus valuation
by their terms must either be zero or infinity, neither of which is tenable. Cross notes
that "[p]erhaps the true value of a given object is the additive total of its use, existence,
and intrinsic values." Cross, supra note 7, at 297 (footnote omitted). Intrinsic value does
have relevance as "evidenced by the policy of the Endangered Species Act [16 U.S.C. §§
1991] 1351
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is willing to pay to preserve the resource for his or her own future use.
Existence value is the price one is willing to pay to preserve a natural
resource regardless of intent to use it in the future. For example, one
might be willing to pay money to preserve Glacier National Park because
he or she plans to go there sometime in the future (option value). The
same person might be willing to pay for preservation of Denali Park
in Alaska without any personal plans to ever visit the park (existence
value). Because no known methodologies can reliably ascertain intrinsic
value, the only nonuse values typically determined when monetizing
natural resource attributes are option and existence values.
3. Use Value v. Nonuse Value
Use value is more precise than nonuse value because it measures
behavior rather than attitude. That is, use value measures how much a
person actually spends while nonuse value estimates how much a person
thinks he or she might be willing to spend. However, problems are
inherent in limiting valuation to use value. One commentator suggests
that "use value recognizes that natural resources only have value to
humans when the resources are used for practical human ends, such as
for fishing or hunting. Use value seeks to measure the monetary im-
portance of the loss of these human uses." 18 The problem is that "use
value ignores the reality that natural resources may have worth beyond
their use by humans. Even unused resources may have some use to
society. Surely a fish is worth something, even if a fisherman never
catches it."' 9
Values attributable to uncaught fish include their role in maintaining
the ecological balance of their environment, their contribution to re-
production of the species, and their contribution to the species gene
pool. Uncaught fish also maintain an option value to anglers who plan
on taking future fishing trips and an existence value for others who
plan to recreate, but not fish. The inability of use value to account for
such worth creates a need for determining nonuse values to attain a
more complete value estimate of natural resources. Accounting for non-
use value necessitates development of methods to monetize nonuse as
well as use value attributes.
1531-1544 (1989)] which seeks to promote the continued existence of embattled forms of
wildlife regardless of human consumptive concerns." Comment, Natural Resource Damage
Assessments for Oil Spills: Policy Considerations Underlying the Evolution of the De-
partment of the Interior's Regulations, I Vill. Envtl. L.J. 491, 509 (1990) (footnote
omitted). However, Interior does not recognize intrinsic value in its regulations, and
because no means are available for determining intrinsic value, the propriety of including
such value attributes in resource damage assessments will not be addressed in this Casenote.
18. Cross, supra note 7, at 281.
19. Id. at 284 (footnote omitted).
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B. Monetizing Natural Resource Attributes
Several methods exist for monetizing the value of natural resource
attributes. Interior's regulations stipulate that "[in estimating use values,
either a market6d or nonmarketed resource methodology, . . . shall be
used.' '20 However, the regulations favor the use of marketed method-
ologies. The regulations require the use of the diminution in market
price of the resource "[u]nless .. . the market for the resource is not
reasonably competitive."' 2' Historically, courts use market value when
assessing damages to public resources where there is a ready market
value for those resources.
22
When the natural resource that is damaged is neither traded in a
market nor comparable to other resources that are traded in a market,
a non-market based valuation method is used to determine a use value
of the resource. Nonmarketed natural resource methodologies include
behavioral use valuation techniques such as contingency valuation
(''CV' ').23
CV is a method for determining use and/or nonuse values of natural
resources. CV methodology "includes all techniques that set up hypo-
thetical markets to elicit an individual's economic valuation of a natural
resource." ' 24 Individual values are determined through a series of so-
phisticated surveys of individuals establishing hypothetical markets to
determine how much those interviewed think the resource is worth. CV
quantifies the three distinct types of natural resource damages that the
20. 43 C.F.R. § 11.83(a)(2) (1990).
21. Id. § 11.83(c)(1) (1990).
22. See, e.g., Atlas Chem. Indus., Inc. v. Anderson, 524 S.W.2d 681 (Tex. 1985)
(the court awarded damages based on the reduction in market value of property caused
by effluent deposits); State of Washington v. Gillette, 27 Wash. App. 815, 621 P.2d 764
(1980) (the court awarded the Washington State Department of Fisheries $3150 (using
market value of the lost resource) for loss of salmon caused by unapproved construction
on the defendant's property).
23. 43 C.F.R. § 11.83(d)(5)(i) (1989). Contingent valuation methods can be used to
determine how much people are willing to pay to use (use value) a natural resource by:
"directly asking individuals about their willingness to pay (WTP) for changes in quantity
of recreation at a particular site. Individual values may be aggregated by summing the
WTPs for all users in the area." 44 Fed. Reg. 72912, 72958 (1979). Contingency valuation
can also establish hypothetical markets:
to determine how much individuals would be willing to pay to have the option
(the "option value") to enjoy viewing a natural resource they are not now using
... [and] to determine how much people would be willing to pay to know that
a [natural resource] exists (the "existence value") for the benefit of current and
future generations, even though they themselves do not intend to see or enjoy
the resource personally.
Olson, Natural Resource Damages in the Wake of the Ohio and Colorado Decisions:
Where Do We Go From Here?, 19 Envtl. L. Rep. 10551, 10555 (1989) (footnote omitted).
24. 43 C.F.R. § 11.83(d)(5)(i) (1989).
19911
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Interior regulations have recognized: use value, and two nonuse values,
option and existence value."
CV surveys determine how much an interviewee is willing to pay
for a resource by: 1) direct questioning, 2) bidding formats wherein the
person is asked if he or she would pay a given amount, after which
the price is adjusted until ascertainment of an agreed upon amount, or
3) a format naming a specific price and allowing the interviewee to take
it or leave it. The CV method thereby determines individual prices or
the use and/or nonuse value of particular resources.
The CV method is the only known means to measure nonuse values
of natural resources, 26 and therein lies the problem with assigning nonuse
values to natural resources. One commentator states: "[clontingent val-
uation is controversial ... because it is entirely hypothetical and because
it assumes that people respond to the survey as they would to a mar-
ketplace transaction. ' 27 Another criticism of the CV method is that
people will respond to questions with answers tailored to produce public
policies that they favor. For example, an environmentalist concerned
about preserving snail darters might respond with a value higher than
he is actually willing to pay for the fish to promote his preservationist
ideas. While such concerns are reasonable, many economists believe well
designed questionnaires appear to minimize the effect of this behavior. 8
Whether respondents possess sufficient information to value resources
accurately is another concern. Because respondents have little experience
placing monetary value on natural resources, results may be inaccurate.
Natural resources have no set value; therefore, no method exists to test
the accuracy of CV surveys. A particularly troubling aspect of CV studies
exemplifying the lack of accuracy is that different questions obtain
substantially different results in value for the same resource. When
25. Cross, supra note 7, at 280-81. Cross, notes that "[the literature in this field
has yet to agree on a standardized set of terms for these value types." Id. at 281 n.53.
Cross labels all nonuse values as existence value which he divides into three parts: option
value, vicarious value, and intemporal value. Option value is the desire to preserve natural
resources for your own future use. Vicarious value is the desire to preserve natural
resources even though there is no intention of future use. Intemporal value is the desire
to save natural resources for the use of future generations. Option value as used in this
Casenote, is equivalent to option value as used by Cross. The Casenote use of existence
value corresponds to vicarious and intemporal value as used by Cross. The terminology
used in this Casenote is the same as that used by the court in Ohio v. Interior.
26. Kopp, Portney, and Smith, Natural Resource Damages: The Economics Have
Shifted After Ohio v. United States Department of the Interior, 20 Envtl. L. Rept. 10127,
10130, (1990), state that "contingent valuation techniques are the only way known to
measure ... nonuse damages." See also Cross, supra note 7, at 320, wherein the author
states that "only contingent valuation measures the existence value of natural resources."
(footnote omitted).
27. Cross, supra note 7, at 315 (footnote omitted).
28. Id. at 316.
[Vol. 511354
NOTES
respondents are asked the price they are willing to pay for preservation
of a natural resource rather than the price for which they would sell
the same resource, results vary. Generally, a respondent's willingness to
pay is much less than the price for which the same respondents would
sell a natural resource. Which response better quantifies the value of
natural resources remains an enigma.
Other concerns about CV methodology include fears that the results
of CV surveys are "unduly dependent upon the information provided
to respondents and the phrasing of the questionnaire. "29 These uncer-
tainties lead many to view CV methods with skepticism. Nonetheless,
if the CV survey is carefully structured, "[ejconomists now generally
agree that at least in some circumstances properly designed contingent
valuation surveys will yield valid results." 30
In sum, valuation methodology differs for distinct value attributes
of natural resources. Both consumptive and non-consumptive use values
can be determined by either market price diminution or by non-market
based valuation methods. Nonuse values such as option and existence
values can only be measured by non-market based CV methodology.
III. THE DUTY TO VALUE NATURAL RESOURCES
Congress enacted CERCLA in 1980.11 CERCLA conferred on the
President the responsibility to promulgate regulations3" for assessing
damages to natural resources resulting from releases of hazardous subst-
ances or oil as provided in CERCLA33 and in the Federal Water Pollution
Prevention and Control Act (popularly known as the Clean Water Act
("CWA")).Y Although CERCLA is best known for its application to
29. Id. at 319.
30. Kopp, supra note 26, at 10130.
31. In 1986, Congress amended CERCLA by the Superfund Amendments and Reau-
thorization Act ("SARA"). All references to CERCLA in this Casenote are to the statute
as amended.
32. 51 Fed. Reg. 27674, 27675 (1986). The President delegated his authority to the
Department of the Interior. The regulations were due by December of 1982, however,
Interior waited until January of 1983 to issue an advanced notice of proposed rulemaking
soliciting public comment as to how it should proceed setting out regulations applicable
to both the type A and type B assessments. Finally, in August of 1986, under a deadline
imposed by the court in New Jersey v. Ruckelshaus, No. 84-1668 (D.N.J. Feb. 5, 1985),
Interior promulgated the regulations challenged in Ohio v. Interior. The regulations are
now codified at 43 C.F.R. §§ 11.10-11.93 (1990).
33. CERCLA is popularly known as Superfund. One commentator refers to CERCLA
as "the full employment act for lawyers, [because it] has generated a prodigious amount
of litigation since its enactment in 1980." Jones & McSlarrow, . . . But Were Afraid to
Ask: Superfund Case Law, 1981-1989, 19 Envtl. L. Rep. 10430, 10430 (1989).
34. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988).
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hazardous waste disposal site cleanup," it is also important because it
permits governmental entities to recover damages for "injury to, de-
struction of, or loss of natural resources, including the reasonable costs
of assessing such injury, destruction, or loss . . "36
CERCLA broadly defines natural resources as "land, fish, wildlife,
biota, air, water, ground water, drinking water supplies, and other such
resources belonging to, managed by, . . . appertaining to, or otherwise
controlled by the United States . . . any State or local government, [or]
any foreign government . . . . 7 The Act designates state or federal
authorities to "act on behalf of the public as trustees for natural
resources" 3 in bringing actions to recover for resource damages. If an
action is brought against a party and the court finds the party liable
for the damage, the court must assess damages commensurate with the
degree of injury to the resources. CERCLA requires that all recovered
monies are used "to restore, replace, or acquire the equivalent of such
natural resources." 39
IV. CERCLA REGULATIONS
Congress directed that CERCLA "regulations shall identify the best
available procedures to determine ... damages, including both direct
and indirect injury, destruction, or loss and shall take into consideration
factors including, but not limited to, replacement value, use value, and
ability of the ecosystem or resource to recover. -40 To this end, CERCLA
directs the regulations to prescribe two types of damage assessment
procedures: one procedure for assessing damages caused by minor spills
and a second for assessing large or particularly damaging spills and
releases .4
Following CERCLA's mandate, Interior promulgated two sets of
rules. Type A regulations (subpart (D))41 specify "standard procedures
35. Breen, Citizen Suits For Natural Resource Damages: Closing A Gap In Federal
Law, 24 Wake Forest L. Rev. 851, 859-60 (1989). "[T]he Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) has identified 30,844 potential waste sites where CERCLA could apply." (The
author cites several sources concluding that even this figure is too low.) "The General
Accounting Office estimates that the universe of potential CERCLA sites is 130,000 to
425,000 ... [with estimates of] the total cost of cleaning up ... [amounting to] $500
billion over the next fifty years." Id. (footnotes omitted).
36. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(C) (1988).
37. Id. § 9601(16).
38. Id. § 9607(f)(2)(A) & (B).
39. Id. § 9607(f)(1).
40. Id. § %51(c)(2) (emphasis added).
41. Id. § 9651(c)(2).
42. 43 C.F.R. § 11.40-11.41 (1990).
The purpose of the [Type A] procedures ... is to provide a simplified assessment
[Vol. 511356
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for simplified assessments requiring minimal field observation ' '43 intended
to govern most minor spills and releases. Type B regulations (subpart
(E))" specify "alternative protocols for conducting assessments in in-
dividual cases to determine the type and extent of short and long-term
injury, destruction or loss." ' 45 Type B regulations are for assessing dam-
ages caused by major spills.
CERCLA provides for designation of authorized federal" and state47
trustees to assess natural resource damages and press claims for the
recovery of such damages, under both CERCLA and the CWA. CER-
CLA does not require that the trustees utilize either the type A or type
B procedures. However, CERCLA provides that assessments performed
in accordance with the prescribed procedures are entitled to a rebuttable
presumption of accuracy in a proceeding to recover damages from a
responsible party. 4
The Interior regulations establish a four phase procedure for assessing
damages. In the initial or "preassessment phase ' 49 a trustee determines
whether natural resources may have been damaged by a release of oil
or hazardous materials. Upon discovering injuries to natural resources
the trustee enters the "assessment plan phase." 50 During this second
phase, the trustee maps out an assessment strategy. The regulations
direct the trustee to "select between performing a natural resource
damage assessment using either type A assessment procedures ... or
type B assessment procedures. . . ."" If the trustee determines that type
B procedures are necessary, the third step, or the "assessment phase," '5 2
under type B, requires that the trustee: (1) establish whether in fact
natural resources have been damaged, (2) quantify the extent of the
process involving minimal field observation to determine injury, quantify that
injury, and determine damages in coastal and marine environments resulting
from a discharge or release. The procedures require the use of a computer
model referred to as the Natural Resource Damage Assessment Model for Coastal
and Marine Environments (NRDAM/CME).
Id. at § l1.41(a)(l).
43. 42 U.S.C. § 9651(c)(2) (1988).
44. 43 C.F.R. §§ 11.60-11.84 (1990).
45. 42 U.S.C. § 9651(c)(2)(B) (1988).
46. Id. § 9607(f)(2)(A): "The President shall designate . .. the Federal officials who
shall act on behalf of the public as trustees for natural resources under this chapter and
section 1321 of Title 33 [CWA]."
47. Id. § 9607(f)(2)(B): "The Governor of each state shall designate State officials
who may act on behalf of the public as trustees for natural resources under this chapter
and section 1321 of Title 33 [CWA] and shall notify the President of such designations."
48. Id. § 9607(f)(2)(C).
49. 43 C.F.R. §§ 11.20-11.25 (1989).
50. Id. §§ 11.30-11.35.
51. Id. § 11.33(a).
52. Id. §§ 11.60-11.84.
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injuries, and (3) ascertain the appropriate dollar amount of damages
caused by the release. In the final or "post-assessment phase," 53 the
trustee documents the assessment process and demands payment from
the responsible party.
Step three, the assessment phase of the type B regulations, prescribed
a hierarchy of permissible methods for determining the use value of
natural resources. Interior's regulations favored valuing resources at their
market price. "Unless the authorized official determines that the market
for the resource is not reasonably competitive, the diminution in the
market price of the resource shall be used to estimate the damages to
the injured resource. ' 5 4 In the absence of competitive markets, the
regulations prescribed an appraisal method to estimate market value
before and after damages. The rules allowed the use of other valuation
techniques only when neither market nor appraisal methods were avail-
able.
The type B regulations also prescribed valuation techniques other
than market or appraisal methods. One such technique, CV methodology,
was to be used to "determine use values and [to] explicitly determine
option and existence values."" But "[tihe use of the contingent valuation
methodology to explicitly estimate option and existence values should
be used only if the authorized official determines that no use values
can be determined."5 6 Regardless of the limited use of CV prescribed
by the regulations, industry petitioners complained that its use would
"permit or encourage overstated damages."'"
V. REVIEw IN THiE D.C. CIRCUIT
A. Petitioners' Complaints
1. Industry
In Ohio v. Interior petitioners challenged the type B regulations
promulgated by Interior pursuant to CERCLA18 Specifically, industry
petitioners focused their attack on the use of CV methodology in the
regulations. They offered two principal complaints. First, the industry
petitioners argued that CV methodology is not a "best available pro-
53. Id. §§ 11.90-11.93.
54. Id. § 11.83(c)(1).
55. Id. § 11.83 (d)(5)(i).
56. Id. § 11.83 (d)(5)(ii).
57. 880 F.2d 432, 438 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
58. The type A rules were challenged in State of Colorado v. U.S. Dept. of Interior,
880 F.2d 481 (D.C. Cir. 1989), a companion case to the Ohio v. Interior decision.
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cedure" as required by CERCLA59 because of the method's imprecision
and because surveys taken after a natural resource damaging accident
would be fraught with bias. Second, the industry petitioners argued that
Interior's extension of CERCLA's rebuttable presumption to CV esti-
mates is arbitrary and capricious and a violation of a responsible party's
due process rights.
2. State and Environmental
The court also considered numerous complaints filed by state and
environmental petitioners. The complaints focused on procedures gov-
erning ascertainment of the appropriate dollar amount of damages during
step three of the type B assessment. State and environmental petitioners
"insist[ed] that CERCLA requires damages to be at least sufficient to
pay the cost in every case of restoring, replacing or acquiring the
equivalent of the damaged resource. ... "6 The petitioners attacked
Interior's establishment of a hierarchy of methods for calculating use
values complaining that the hierarchy caused the "regulations' alleged
undervaluation of the damages recoverable from parties responsible for
hazardous materials spills that despoil natural resources. '"61 The peti-
tioners complained that the hierarchy's "reliance on market value is an
unreasonable interpretation of [CERCLA]."62
The hierarchy of permissible methods for valuing natural resources
established by Interior's regulations favored market price values. In the
absence of a market, an appraisal method was to be used. When neither
market nor appraisal methods were available, the regulations allowed
the use of alternate valuation techniques, including CV.
B. The Court's Resolution
1. Industry Challenges
The court affirmed the use of CV as a method for assessing the
value of natural resources. The court also instructed Interior to prom-
ulgate regulations that account for option and existence values. Because
Interior has decided not to appeal the decision by the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit Court of Appeals, 63 the focus of environmental damage
assessment should shift from the traditional common law methods fo-
cusing on the monetary value to those who consume or use the envi-
59. 880 F.2d at 476.
60. Id. at 441.
61. Id. at 438.
62. Id. at 462.
63. Olson, supra note 23, at 10556 n.67.
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ronment for gain to an increased emphasis on the less traditional nonuse
values. This change in philosophy could have tremendous economic
consequences for those who damage the environment. Counsel for the
National Wildlife Federation (one of the environmental petitioners),
stated: "Now, natural resource damage liability can easily be of the
same magnitude as the more widely appreciated liability for response
costs.'"'6 A second commentator states that "the acceptance of contingent
valuation techniques-has the effect of expanding damage awards.''61
Industry petitioners argued that the use of CV methodology would
amount to both a statutory violation of CERCLA and a violation of
their Constitutional rights.
a. Is CV Methodology a "Best Available Procedure"?
i. Harmony With Common Law
Industry complained that "CV methodology, ... is rife with spec-
ulation, amounting to no more than ordinary public opinion polling
... [that] the CV process is imprecise, is untested, and has built-in
bias and a propensity to produce overestimation."66 Industry petitioners
felt that the imprecision caused the regulations to suffer "fatal departures
from CERCLA on grounds that CV methodology is inharmonious with
common law damage assessment principles, and is considerably less than
a 'best available procedure." '' 67
The court rejected the contention that common law damage standards
apply to CERCLA. However, the court agreed that CERCLA "require[s]
utilization of the 'best available procedures' for determination of dam-
ages flowing from destruction of or injury to natural resources." 68 In
answer to Industry petitioners' complaint, the court found that Interior's
decision to adopt CV was carefully made after considerable study of
papers and discussions addressing the use of CV. Interior realized that
CV needs to be carefully structured and applied by professionals. The
court concluded: "We find [Interior's] promulgation of CV methodology
reasonable and consistent with congressional intent, and therefore worthy
of deference. "69
The court reasoned that Interior "surveyed a number of studies
which analyzed the methodology, addressed the shortcomings of various
questionnaires, and recommended steps needed to fashion reliable CV
64. Id. at 10551.
65. Kopp, supra note 26, at 10130.
66. 880 F.2d at 476.
67. Id. at 476.
68. Id. at 476 (quoting from 42 U.S.C. § 9651(c)(2) (1982)).
69. Id. at 476-77 (emphasis added).
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assessments. "70 The court noted studies offered by industry showing that
survey respondents have a tendency to "overstate their willingness-to-
pay' '7 for damaged natural resources because they do not actually have
to spend money. But the court determined that "[t]he simple and obvious
safeguard against overstatement, however, is more sophisticated ques-
tioning. '72 The court found the regulations to provide sufficient guidance
concerning the use of CV.
ii. Bias Due to Post-Accident Assessment of Damages
Industry petitioners also complained that the application of CV
methodology "after an oil leak oi a hazardous waste release has occurred
.. is fraught with a significant bias leading to overvaluation of the
damaged resources."" The court concluded that it is impossible to solicit
individual valuations of natural resources prior to an incident to "avoid
any upward bias in the event that the resource is later damaged." 7 4 The
court also found that valuation prior to damage runs counter to CER-
CLA's predilection for restoration. The court determined that bias from
post-accident assessment alone does not reduce CV methodology to
something less than a "best available procedure. ' 7 Thus the court
"sustain[ed] [Interior] in its conclusion that CV methodology is a 'best
available procedure.' As such, its [inclusion] in the Natural Resource
Damage Assessment regulations was entirely proper. ' 7 6
b. Inclusion of the Rebuttable Presumption
i. Arbitrary and Capricious
Industry petitioners complained that Interior did not fully respond
to their comments regarding the implementation of CV methodology
and that Interior has insufficient justification for the use of CV to
measure option and existence values. Industry thus argued that Interior's
extension of CERCLA's rebuttable presumption to CV assessment is
arbitrary and capricious, and violative of due process rights of a po-
tentially responsible party.77 Industry voiced great concern over the ab-
sence of CV assessments used to determine damages for injury to natural
resources. Because of the absence of use, industry argued that CV
70. Id. at 477 (footnote omitted).
71. Id.




76. Id. (emphasis added).
77. Id.
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remains a hypothetical method of assessment. Industry also complained
of a lack of guidance on when or how the CV method might be utilized.
In deciding whether the implementation of CV was arbitrary and
capricious, the court relied on language from Motor Vehicle Mfgs. Ass'n
v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co.,8 wherein the Supreme Court held that
agency action is arbitrary or capricious if the agency has:
relied on factors which Congress has not intended to consider,
entirely failed to consider an important aspect of a problem,
offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the
evidence before the agency, or is implausible that it could not
be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency
expertise.79
The court further stated that "when an agency relies upon an
economic model, it is incumbent upon it to 'provide a full and analytical
defense' of the model." 80 Agencies must provide a defense because "[ulse
of a predictive model acknowledges implicitly that there are instances
in which factors will affect the outcome"'" and those factors must be
explained. However, an agency's choice of an economic model must be
respected when that agency shows that it has "examine[d] the relevant
data and articulate[d] a reasoned basis for its decision." 82
The court decided that Interior met this burden with a showing that
"CV methodology was thoroughly investigated, comments were analyzed
and dealt with, and changes were made to refine the use of CV. The
record does not support the claim that [Interior's] treatment of industry
petitioners' comments was arbitrary or capricious." 83 The court also
found that the lack of guidance did not make the adoption of CV
arbitrary or capricious because the propriety and form of CV meth-
odology must be adapted to each individual spill, thus establishing a
need for flexibility.
ii. Violation of Due Process
Industry petitioners also complained that the presumption that as-
sessments using CV methodology are correct violates both substantive
and procedural due process. However, the court found no merit to these
complaints. The court found no violation of substantive due process by
78. 463 U.S. 29, 43, 103 S. Ct. 2856, 2867 (1983).
79. Id. at 43, 103 S. Ct. at 2867.
80. 880 F.2d at 479 (quoting Eagle-Picher Indus. v. EPA, 759 F.2d 905, 921 (1985)
(footnote omitted)).
81. Id.
82. Id. (brackets in original) (quoting NRDC v. Herrington, 768 F.2d 1355, 1385
(1985)).
83. Id. at 479.
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inclusion of a rebuttable presumption. Instead, the court determined
that the inclusion of a rebuttable presumption leads to a concomitant
increase in judicial efficiency. Without the presumption the courts would
face "the specter of prolonged battles of experts and other heavy burdens
on [their] calendars.' '
The procedural due process challenge concerned the damage assess-
ment proceedings in which the authorized official is deemed "an inter-
ested party with discretionary power to exclude potentially responsible
parties from the assessment process."s The court replied that procedural
due process was not violated because: 1) potentially responsible parties
would not be totally excluded from the proceedings to determine damage
amounts and 2) the authorized official has no personal stake in the
determination of recovery. The court thereby refuted Industry Petitioners'
complaints.
2. State and Environmental Challenges
The court agreed with state and environmental petitioners' complaints
that the hierarchy of assessment methods prescribed by Interior under-
values natural resources. The court found error in the regulations' de-
pendence on market price determinations. On remand, the court ordered
Interior to promulgate regulations that allow the inclusion of all use
values that can be reliably calculated.
a. Standard of Review
In reviewing Interior's interpretation of CERCLA, the court applied
the Chevron test." The Chevron test consists of two steps. In step one
the court asks whether Congress has spoken to the precise question at
issue. If the answer is yes, effect must be given to Congress' intent.
Courts use step two of the Chevron test when Congress is ambiguous
or silent on an issue. Congressional silence is taken as an implicit
delegation of power to the agency to make policy choices. The court
must defer to the agency's interpretation of the statute if the interpre-
tation is reasonable and consistent with the statutory purpose.
The court applied the second prong of the Chevron test to determine
the propriety of Interior's hierarchy of assessment methods. The regu-
lations limited recovery for a damaged resource to the price commanded
by the resource on the open market unless the trustee determined that
"the market for the resource is not reasonably competitive. 's7 The Ohio
84. Id. at 480.
85. Id.
86. Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43, 104 S. Ct.
2778, 2781 (1984).
87. 43 C.F.R. § 11.83(c)(1) (1990).
1991] 1363
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
v. Interior court agreed with environmental petitioners' view that the
rigid hierarchy is an unreasonable interpretation of CERCLA. The court
found it "unreasonable to view market price as the exclusive factor, or
even the predominant one. From the bald eagle to the blue whale and
snail darter, natural resources have values that are not fully captured
by the market system."" Natural resources might have components that
are traded in competitive markets but their "total use values are not
fully reflected in the prices they command in those markets.''89
b. Does the Hierarchy of Assessment Methods Undervalue
Natural Resources?
The court cited two specific examples indicative of the undervaluation
problem of Interior's established hierarchy. The first is the value that
market price reasoning assigns to a fur seal. Interior's hierarchy specifies
a use value of $15 per seal, the market price of a seal's pelt. The court
reasoned that Interior's price is too low to replace destroyed seals. The
second example is the method that Interior employs in assigning a value
to national parks. The market price of a national park is determined
by summing the fees charged to the public using the park. Such a
valuation method undervalues national parks because the fees are pur-
posely set low to encourage public use rather than to maximize profits.90
The court decided that Interior's decision to limit the role of use
values other than market prices was an erroneous interpretation of
CERCLA because "Congress intended the damage assessment regulations
to capture fully all aspects of loss." 9' The D.C. Circuit Court determined
Interior's emphasis on market value was an unreasonable interpretation
of CERCLA under the second prong of the Chevron test. CERCLA
"requires Interior to 'take into consideration factors including, but not
limited to ... use value.'
'92
Also, the court determined that under Interior's own interpretation
of CERCLA, option and existence values should not "be excluded from
the category of recognized use values." 93 According to the court "[oiption
and existence values may represent 'passive' use, but they nonetheless
reflect utility derived by humans from a resource, and thus, prima facie,
ought to be included in a damage assessment." 94 In analyzing the intent
88. 880 F.2d at 462-63 (emphasis in original).
89. Id. at 463,
90. Interior explains this valuation by "point[ing] out that these fees are what the
government has determined to represent the value of the natural resource and represent
an offer by a willing seller." 51 Fed. Reg. 27674, 27719 (1986).
91. 880 F.2d at 463.
92. Id. at 464 (emphasis in original).
93. Id.
94. Id. (emphasis in original).
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of CERCLA, the court read the phrase "but not limited to ... use
value" to express a clear intent to consider other factors "in addition
to use value." 95 The court decided that the rules promulgated by Interior
"arbitrarily limit[] use values to market prices." On remand, the court
ordered Interior to permit trustees to derive use values including "all
reliably calculated use values, however measured, so long as the trustee
does not double count. '"' This mandate included an instruction that
Interior's "decision to limit the role of non-consumptive values, such
as option and existence values, in the calculation of use value rests on
an erroneous construction of the statute." 97 Thus, the court ordered the
consideration of "all reliably calculated use values" 98g which according
to the court includes option and existence values.
VI. DISCUSSION
Three issues are raised by the D.C. Circuit Court's opinion. The
first is the court's action in sustaining Interior's promulgation of re-
gulations calling for the use of CV methodology. The court sustained
CV methodology for use value determinations and the use of CV for
measuring nonuse option and existence values in extraordinary circum-
stances only. The second issue is the D.C. Circuit Court's erroneous
classification of option and existence values as use values to be calculated
with all other use values. The court states: "Option and existence values
may represent 'passive' use, but they nonetheless reflect utility derived
by humans from a resource, and thus, prima facie, ought to be included
in a damage assessment."" This error in classification gives rise to the
question of whether there is a duty to consider nonuse values in all
natural resource damage assessments. The third issue also results from
the court's inaccurate classification of option and existence values. By
inappropriately classifying them as "passive" use values to be calculated
with all other use values, the court expands the use of CV methodology
for calculating nonuse values. The expanded use of CV for calculating
nonuse values results from the fact that option and existence values can
only be calculated using CV methodology. The expansion appears un-
intentional when considered with the court's ruling on Interior's regu-
lations governing the use of CV methodology.
A. The Court's Acceptance of CV
In sustaining Interior's use of CV methodology against industry
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terior's proposed use of the methodology. Thus, absent further instruc-
tion, the court's affirmation of CV methodology limits its use to value
determinations "when neither the market price nor the appraisal meth-
odology is appropriate. . . ."10 In such situations CV methodology can
be used to calculate both use values and nonuse values. For use value
determinations, Interior states that "contingent valuation is just as valid
a method to estimate use as the other methods listed."''1
Under Interior's regulations, CV would also be used for determi-
nations of nonuse option and existence values when no use values can
be determined. However, such use of "contingent valuation to explicitly
measure option and existence values is limited in this final rule . . . to
take into account those extraordinary circumstances when the authorized
official cannot determine a use value for the resource."' 0 2 Left unaltered,
this limited use of CV methodology for nonuse option and existence
value determinations would have minimal impact on natural resource
damage assessments. However, the court's ruling broadens the application
of CV methodology for determining option and existence values. The
expansion is an incidental result of the court's invalidating the hierarchy
of assessment methods and requiring the assessment of all use values.
As explained later, the court incorrectly classified option and existence
values as non-consumptive use values. Option and existence values (which
are actually nonuse values) can be determined only by using CV. Thus,
the court's incorrect classification of option and existence values will
conceivably result in the use of CV methodology in all damage assess-
ments.
B. Classification of Option and Existence Values
The court rejected the hierarchy of assessment methods finding that
it arbitrarily limited use values to market prices and that it "limit[ed]
the role of non-consumptive values, such as option and existence values,
in the calculation of use values. ..." o The court reasoned that CER-
CLA requires Interior to take into account factors in addition to use
values, stating: "[CERCLA] requires Interior to 'take into consideration
factors including but not limited to ... use values. ' °4
When it rejected the hierarchy of assessment methods, the court
instructed Interior not to "arbitrarily limit use value to market prices." 0 5
Following this order, Interior must expand its implementation of esti-
100. 43 C.F.R. § 11.83(d)(1) (1990).
101. 51 Fed. Reg. 27674, 27719 (1986).
102. Id. at 27719.





mates of use value to allow calculation by methods other than market
price analysis. Interior must promulgate regulations allowing trustees to
choose the best suited method of assessment when calculating use values.
Because the Department has stated that "CV is just as valid a method
to estimate use values as the other methods listed,"'' ° the ruling allows
trustees to use CV methodology when calculating use values. Indeed,
the court instructed Interior to "permit trustees to derive use values for
natural resources by summing up all reliably calculated use values,
however measured."'' 7 The court clearly states that all use values, whether
consumptive or non-consumptive, be considered in all damage assess-
ments, but the court's ruling creates confusion as to a duty to consider
nonuse values. The confusion results from the court's erroneous clas-
sification of option and existence values.
1. Duty to Consider Nonuse Values
The court's opinion confuses distinctions between passive use values
and nonuse values. At one point the court refers to industry petitioners'
claim that option and existence values are nonuse values stating: "we
have already rejected this conclusion .... Option and existence values
are non-consumptive values compensable under the terms of CER-
CLA." 108 This conclusion is incorrect because non-consumptive use value
is not equivalent to nonuse value. Nonuse values comprehend no actual
use of the resource; non-consumptive use value requires passive use of
the resource. Whereas passive or non-consumptive use contemplates use
of natural resources, option and existence values do not even require
actual contact with the resource by the person assigning a value to it.
Because option and existence values exist independent of use of the
actual resource, a resident of Baton Rouge may suffer a measurable
loss because of the Exxon Valdez oil spill, whether or not that person
plans to ever go to Valdez, Alaska.
The court's interpretation of option and existence values as non-
consumptive or passive use values is unreasonable. The court states that
"the CERCLA 301 Project Team draft referred to option and existence
values as 'non-consumptive use values." ' ' ' 9 The source of this comment
is not clear. Contrary to any remarks in earlier drafts, it is abundantly
clear that Interior considers option and existence values to be nonuse
values. Interior's regulations state: "Estimation of option and existence
values shall be used only if the authorized official determines that no
106. 51 Fed. Reg. 27674, 27719 (1986).
107. 880 F.2d at 464.
108. Id. at 476 n.77.
109. Id. at 464.
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use values can be determined." 0 In its final rule action, Interior states:
"[miany other comments stated that option and existence values, i.e.,
non-use values, should be given weight and consideration equal to that
given to use values.""' Thus, Interior considers option and existence
values as values other than use values, i.e. nonuse values. The court
on the other hand refers to option and existence values as 'passive'
use""12 values. Commentators, including those cited as authorities by
the court, agree with Interior's classification of option and existence
values.
The court relies on two commentators extensively in its opinion." 3
Both unambiguously define option and existence values as nonuse value.
One states that "[tihe worth of natural resources beyond their use value
is labeled existence value."" 4 When he describes assessment of damages,
the first commentator reasons that "[niatural resource damages can
capture these nonuse existence values."' ' Yet the court cites this very
authority when stating: "Option and existence values may represent
'passive' use. .. .6
While discussing the Interior regulations, the second commentator
states: "if a lost resource has a value to citizens who do not use it but
value its existence, these 'non-use' values cannot be included in the
damage assessment. Technically, the Department [Interior] permits lost
non-use values to be counted, but only when lost use values cannot be
computed. Economists, however, have never developed successful tech-
niques for measuring non-use values alone ... .""" Obviously, this com-
110. 43 C.F.R. § 11.83(b)(2) (1990) (emphasis added).
Ill. 51 Fed. Reg. 27674, 27719 (1986) (emphasis added).
112. 880 F.2d at 464.
113. The court cites both Cross, supra note 7, and Anderson, Natural Resource
Damages, Superfund, and the Courts, 16 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 405 (1989), for a
number of propositions. Both are cited for the proposition that "[sicholars agree that
recovery of full restoration costs in every case, no matter how large the sum is, is not
required by CERCLA." 880 F.2d at 443 n.7. The two commentators are also cited for
sharing skepticism with Congress over the ability of humans to measure the true value
of natural resources. Id. at 457 n.40. In addition, Anderson is cited as a general source
for the proposition that "market prices are not acceptable as primary measures of the
use values of natural resources." Id. at 463. Finally, Cross is incorrectly cited for the
proposition that "[olption and existence values may represent 'passive' use. Id. at
464.
114. Cross, supra note 7, at 285-86 (emphasis added). Cross describes three types of
existence values: 1) option value- the desire to preserve because of plans for future use,
2) vicarious value-the desire to preserve without plans for future use, and 3) intertemporal
value- preservation for the use of descendants. (Thus Cross' latter two values are equivalent
to the court's existence value.)
115. Id. at 286 (emphasis added).
116. 880 F.2d at 464.
117. Anderson, supra note 113, at 442-43 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
1368 [Vol. 51
NOTES
mentator also classifies option and existence values as nonuse values.
Other commentators agree that existence and option values represent
nonuse values. For example, one commentator in describing the impli-
cations of the Ohio v. Interior ruling on the hierarchy of assessments
methods states: "the implication of this ruling for damage assessments
seems clear. Nonuse values would now appear to have equal standing
with conventional use values and must be included in damage awards.""
These commentators consider existence and option values to be nonuse
values rather than "passive" use values as suggested by the court. To
accept the proposition that option and existence values are nonuse values
gives rise to the question of whether CERCLA compels Interior to
require the calculation of nonuse values for all damage assessments.
The court's claim that Interior misconstrued its own interpretation
of CERCLA was misguided. Interior's interpretation of CERCLA is
that it requires the inclusion of use values only, except where no use
values can be determined. Interior authorizes nonuse value determinations
only in those situations where no use values can be determined. Thus,
it follows by Interior's interpretation of CERCLA that nonuse values,
such as option and existence values, are not necessary components of
the majority of damage assessments. Interior did not misconstrue its
own interpretation of CERCLA. Rather, the court decided that CERCLA
requires consideration of factors beyond use values for all damage
assessments based on the "not limited to" language of the statute." 9
In reviewing Interior's interpretation of CERCLA, the court used the
Chevron test as its standard.
To mandate that Interior expand its regulations to include nonuse
option and existence values in all damage assessments, the court had
to find that Interior's regulations governing determination of nonuse
values failed the Chevron test. The court determined that Congress had
not spoken to the precise question at issue. Thus, Interior's regulations
must be a reasonable interpretation of CERCLA under the second prong
of the Chevron test. The court reasoned that CERCLA requires Interior
to take into account factors in addition to use values, stating: "[CER-
CLA] requires Interior to 'take into consideration factors including but
not limited to . . .use values.""11 20 The section of the CERCLA sentence
cited by the court reads: "take into consideration factors including, but
not limited to, replacement value, use value, and ability of the ecosystem
or resource to recover."'
21
The court is correct in its reasoning that the language requires more
than consideration of use value. However, it can be denied that CER-
118. Kopp, supra note 26, at 10129 (emphasis added).
119. 880 F.2d at 464.
120. Id.
121. 42 U.S.C. § 9651(c)(2) (1988).
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CLA's language requires consideration of nonuse values. CERCLA lists
three natural resource attributes that Interior must consider at a minimum
in its damage assessments. CERCLA does not list nonuse values as one
factor. Thus, had the court correctly classified option and existence
values as nonuse values, it should have realized that CERCLA does not
require that Interior's regulations include calculations of those values.
By not listing factors other than the three that Interior must take into
account, Congress has left their enumeration to agency discretion.
Under Chevron the question becomes, is Interior's interpretation of
CERCLA reasonable and consistent with the statutory purpose? If not,
must Interior consider all values-consumptive use value, passive use
value, and nonuse values-when calculating damage assessments? If all
values must be considered, then Interior must expand the use of CV
methodology to all damage assessments because it is the only means to
calculate nonuse values. The answer is crucial to determining the cost
of natural resource damages.
The language of CERCLA does not speak directly to the issue of
nonuse values. CERCLA requires that the regulations "shall take into
consideration factors including, but not limited to, replacement value,
use value, and ability of the ecosystem or resource to recover."' 2 Interior
did not limit consideration to the three factors listed in CERCLA. The
regulations allowed the trustee to compute nonuse option and existence
values when "the authorized official determines that no use values can
be determined." ' '23 Also, where the trustee is "the majority operator or
controller of a for- or not-for-profit enterprise, and the injury to the
natural resource results in a loss to such an enterprise," the trustee may
include as a measure of damages "that portion of the lost net income
due the agency ... resulting directly or indirectly from the injury to
the natural resource .. ."124 By allowing the consideration of nonuse
values and lost profits, the regulations allowed the trustee to take into
consideration factors not limited to replacement value, use value, or the
recoverability of the natural resource.
Congress' silence on nonuse values is a grant of agency discretion
to enumerate the factors to consider in damage assessments. Thus,
Interior's interpretation that nonuse values only be considered when "no
use values can be determined ' 1 zs was a reasonable interpretation of
CERCLA. The court's mandate is improper because it forces Interior
to expand the consideration of nonuse values beyond the requirements
of CERCLA. The court's mandate also expands the use of CV meth-
122. Id.
123. 43 C.F.R.,§ 11.83(d)(5)(ii) (1990).
124. Id. § 11.83(b)(3).
125. Id. § 11.83(d)(5)(ii).
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odology beyond the scope of Interior's regulations that the court ap-
proved.
C. Scope of CV
The court's ruling on Interior's regulations governing use of CV
methodology by no means calls for an expanded use of CV for measuring
nonuse values such as option and existence values. In fact, the court
explicitly states that finding the hierarchy of use values inconsistent with
CERCLA "does not affect the manner in which the CV methodology
operates, or whether it produces sufficiently accurate results to be in-
cluded in the regulations.' ' 26 This statement buttresses the argument
that the court accepts Interior's limited use of CV methodology and
that the court did not intend to expand the use of CV when validating
that method to assess natural resource damages.
But when the court "instruct[ed] [Interior] that its decision to limit
the role of non-consumptive values, such as option and existence values,
rest[ed] on an erroneous construction of the statute[,j' ' 27 the court may
have unintentionally expanded the use of CV. The court found error
in Interior's interpretation of CERCLA. The court also found error in
Interior's understanding of Interior's own faulty interpretation of CER-
CLA. The latter finding actually rests on the court's incorrect conclusion
that Interior considers option and existence values to be passive use
values.
Option and existence values are not "passive" use values; they are
nonuse value attributes of natural resources. To determine the value
attributable to a resource's option and existence values, one must use
CV methodology. By first incorrectly labeling option and existence values
as "passive" use values and then requiring that all use values be included
in every damage assessment, the court mandates that option and existence
values be determined for every damage assessment. Because option and
existence values can only be determined by CV methodology, the er-
roneous labeling forces expanded use of CV. The court's ruling is
problematical because of the expanded use of CV methodology required
to fulfill its mandate.
CERCLA's purpose is not to exact the greatest monetary awards
possible; instead "CERCLA unambiguously mandates a distinct pref-
erence for using restoration costs as the measure of damages....
The court states: "Congress established a distinct preference for res-
toration cost as the measure of recovery in natural resource damage
126. 880 F.2d 432, 476 n.76 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
127. Id. at 464.
128. Id. at 444.
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cases. '"129 Interior has determined that proper assessments using con-
sumptive and non-consumptive use values will accomplish this statutory
goal.
CV methodology is controversial because it is an untested, hypo-
thetical method for estimating value that may result in inflated damage
estimates. While Interior incorporated use of the CV method in its
regulations, it did so on a very limited basis. Expanded use of CV is
not required by CERCLA. Expanded use of CV will expose those
responsible for environmental harm to inflated damages. Exposure to
inflated damages is an inefficient use of the resources available to society.
Interior is careful to separate the use of CV methodology for cal-
culating use values and nonuse option and existence values. Unfortu-
nately, the court's opinion sends mixed signals. In upholding Interior's
regulations regarding the use of CV methodology, the court sanctioned
use of CV for calculating nonuse values to take into account those
extraordinary circumstances when "the authorized official determines
that no use values can be determined."' 30 But by requiring the inclusion
of option and existence value calculations, the court is greatly expanding
the use of CV methodology.
If the court intends that Interior order the trustee to consider both
use and nonuse values in assessing damages, the result will be a significant
increase in cost to those who damage natural resources. Commentators
who have written on this decision to date agree that damage awards
should increase as a result of using CV methodology.' None of these
commentators have analyzed the extent to which the court intended the
use of CV.
If both use and nonuse values must be determined, a damage as-
sessment would consist of assessing use values by any available means
such as market value, appraisal value, or CV, and also assessing nonuse
values by the only means available, CV methodology. For example, if
a hazardous release were to damage a national park that received 100
visitors per year, the damage assessment would include the use value
of those 100 visitors. If 50 of the visitors fished, the value would
account for the consumptive use of those visitors (the number of fish
caught) along with the value of license fees, bait costs, and travel costs.
If the other 50 visitors were bird watchers, the assessment would account
for their non-consumptive use value (the price that these people are
willing to pay to bird watch; perhaps the cost of binoculars, field guides,
129. Id. at 459.
130. 43 C.F.R. § 11.83(d)(5)(ii) (1989).
131. E.g., Kopp, supra note 26, at 10130 states that "the acceptance of contingent
valuation techniques-has the effect of expanding damage awards .... Olson, supra note
23, at 10551 claims that the decision will "substantially increase[] corporations' liability
for natural resource damages under CERCLA ..
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and travel costs). To these values would be added the nonuse option
and existence values calculated with CV techniques. The nonuse values
would be determined by polling a random sample of no less than 200
households drawn from the regional population of households.' Thus,
if the court intends use and nonuse values to be assessed, a much larger
value would result because of the increased base of people whom assign
values to the resource.
If the court intends that Interior only address all use values by the
best means available according to the trustee's determination, an increase
in damage assessment is likely but it will probably be smaller than if
the assessment considers nonuse values as well. Under this approach,
the trustee might determine that the market value of fish (such as the
price a restaurant is willing to pay) is less than the sport fishing value
of the fish (the price an angler is willing to pay). To determine the
sport fishing value, the trustee could design a CV survey to determine
the value of fishing to those 50 people who fish. This should increase
the damage assessment as compared to the amounts calculated using
market value techniques. However, the degree of increase would not
approach the amount calculated by combining use and nonuse values.
The court is less precise than Interior in its use of valuation ter-
minology. The problem with the court's confusion of nonuse option
and existence values with passive use values is that any of the prescribed
methodologies can calculate passive (or non-consumptive) use values but
only CV methodology can calculate nonuse values. Requiring the cal-
culation of all use values, including passive use values, can be accom-
plished without using CV methodology. However, the court requires
that all use values be calculated, including "passive" use option and
existence values. Because option and existence values can only be cal-
culated using CV, the decision expands the use of CV methodology.
The expansion is either an intentional mandate to determine nonuse
values for all natural resource damage assessments, or an unintentional
mandate caused by a failure to realize that option and existence values
are nonuse values that can only be determined by using CV methodology.
The court confirmed Interior's regulations governing the use of CV
methodology. The regulations restrict the use of option and existence
values in damage assessments to those extraordinary circumstances where
"the authorized official determines that no use values can be deter-
mined."' 33 The court is careful to restrict its ruling on the hierarchy of
assessment methods from affecting the manner in which CV methodology
operates, stating: "We have found [Interior's] current hierarchy of use
values inconsistent with CERCLA. This does not affect the manner in
132. 44 Fed. Reg. 72912, 72961 (1979).
133. 43 C.F.R. § 11.83(d)(5)(ii) (1990).
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which the CV methodology operates, or whether it produces sufficiently
accurate results to be included in the regulations."' 3 4 The language of
the court's opinion that expands the use of CV is found in the section
dealing with the hierarchy of assessments methods rather than in the
section dealing with the use of CV methodology. If the court desired
expanded use of CV, reason dictates that the court would not have so
carefully restricted its ruling on the hierarchy of assessment methods
from affecting the use of CV methodology. While the court clearly
intended to expand damage assessments to include both passive and
consumptive use values, the language of the court's opinion suggests
that use of CV methodology for estimating nonuse values should be
limited. The care engendered by the court in using language to ensure
that its ruling on the hierarchy of assessments does not affect the use
of CV methodology is not suggestive of an intent to expand the use of
CV for estimating nonuse values. Neither does the court's approval of
CV methodology as promulgated by Interior's regulations suggest an
intent to expand the use of CV beyond that envisioned by Interior.
Estimating nonuse values remains an inexact, hypothetical exercise that
should not be expanded to all damage assessments.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Ohio v. Interior decision expands the scope of damages by
mistakenly including option and existence values as passive use values
and ordering Interior to account for all use values in its damage as-
sessment regulations. The court does not clearly stipulate that the cal-
culation of nonuse values is necessary but it does clearly stipulate that
option and existence values have to be computed. In this light, it appears
that the court intended to broaden damage assessments by allowing
natural resource trustees to calculate both consumptive and non-con-
sumptive use values by the best method available any time pollutants
damage the environment.
However, because contingent valuation is an untested, hypothetical
valuation technique, the court conceivably intends that CV methodology
be used only for those situations proposed by Interior. Under this
interpretation, damage assessments would include only use values as
calculated by any named methodology deemed appropriate by the natural
resources' trustee. Thus, CV techniques could be used to calculate use
values if deemed appropriate by the trustee. Exposure to arbitrary sums
is somewhat mitigated when CV assessments are only used to calculate
use values because the respondents actually use the resource and are
therefore more familiar with the value of the resource than are nonusers.
134. 880 F.2d 432, 476 n.76 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
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Under the current Interior regulations, nonuse values are only cal-
culated when the trustee determines that no use values can be determined.
Because of the uncertainties involved in calculating nonuse values using
CV techniques, the Interior regulations that reserve use of CV meth-
odology for those instances where no use value can be determined for
the damaged resource are reasonable. Expanded use of CV may expose
responsible parties to damages in excess of those required to restore the
injured resource. Requiring the responsible party to pay excess damages
is a result that is in conflict with both the economic and the ecological
interpretations of congressional intent expressed in CERCLA. "The ec-
onomic position is that a societal cost-benefit analysis indicates that
imposing liability on responsible parties at a cost greater than the actual
market value of the resources is overly burdensome.""' At odds with
the economic position is the ecological view maintaining "that restoration
costs are favored by the strong policy of CERCLA and the Clean Water
Act for preservation of natural resources."'
36
Exposure to excess damages results because nonuse value determi-
nations require polling of people who may be unfamiliar with the dam-
aged natural resource, resulting in: (1) questionable price determinations
because of unfamiliarity with resource values and (2) exposure to great
bias in damage assessments after publicized incidents. In typical litigation
involving a publicized case, bias is controlled through screening of the
jury. Use of CV methods requires large scale, random opinion polling,
thus denying the protection of screening respondents.
VIII. RECOMUMNDATIONS
Inclusion of nonuse values, as calculated by the CV method, when
use value calculations are capable of determining the value of the natural
resource, would unnecessarily expose those responsible to possibly ar-
bitrary liability. Nonuse values, as calculated by the CV method, should
be restricted in their use. The Interior regulations envision such a limited
use.
On remand, Interior should retain the approved regulations limiting
employment of CV methodology to calculate nonuse values to those
instances where "no use values can be determined.' 37 Interior should
expand damage assessments to include "passive" or non-consumptive
use values as calculated by CV or other methods. Such changes allow
a more comprehensive value assessment of natural resource damages as
intended by the court.
135. See Comment, supra note 17, at 523.
136. Id. at 523-24.
137. 43 C.F.R. § 11.83(d)(5)(ii) (1990).
1991] 1375
6LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
The proposed changes allow comprehensive assessment without ex-
posing those responsible for hazardous materials spills to hypothetical
damage assessments with unlimited liability. Such a change is also con-
sistent with the court's determination that all use values, both non-
consumptive and consumptive, be included in a damage assessment.
Unfortunately, such actions are not consistent with the court's improper
interpretation of option and existence values as "passive" use values
that must be included in damage assessments. Therefore, these changes
would be contrary to the court's mandate.
To promulgate the recommended regulations, Interior must seek
Congressional clarification on the calculation of option and existence
values. Interior should request amendments to CERCLA that 1) require
the calculation of consumptive and non-consumptive use values and 2)
allow the trustee to consider nonuse option and existence values when
no use values can be determined. With the incorporation of these ideas,
CERCLA would read: "Such regulations shall ... take into consider-
ation factors including but not limited to, replacement value, [con-
sumptive and non-consumptive] use value[s], and ability of the ecosystem
or resource to recover. [When the trustee finds that no use values can
be determined, the regulations shall permit consideration of option and
existence values.]'" 3"
Under a scenario limiting the calculation of option and existence
values, fair damage assessments are possible. Such a scenario precludes
compensation for nonuse values regardless of injury to option and
existence attributes. However, by including non-consumptive use values,
damage assessments are comprehensive. Trustees can seek damages suf-
ficient to compensate for all lost use values. Interior has determined
that such damages should sufficiently compensate for the lost use value
of damaged resources and thus fulfill the intent of CERCLA while
remaining fair.
Denis Swords
138. 42 U.S.C. § 9651(c)(2) (1988).
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